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7:10 pm, March 19th, 2026 - 7 comments
Categories: australian politics, China, defence, Donald Trump, Hong Kong, Iran, israel, military, national/act government, Pacific, Peace, Peace, us politics, war -
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By Gordon Campbell, cross-posted from his Werewolf
The Chinese Embassy is right. The recent joint statement by Australia and New Zealand condemning China’s actions in the South China Sea reads like a relic from a bygone colonial era.
A weirdly misplaced concern, too.
At a time when the US and Israeli have (a) harmed the trade routes to and from the Middle East (b) tanked the global economy (c) sent fuel prices surging upwards, and (d) caused our own cost of living to skyrocket – who does Defence Minister Judith Collins choose to criticise? China. Mainly for the potential threat it poses to the trade routes located in its region. Go figure.
Likewise, the joint statement also displayed an absurdly selective morality.
At a time when Israel continues to commit genocide in Gaza, kill thousands of men, women and children indiscriminately across the Middle East, displace hundreds of thousands more, reduce essential infrastructure to rubble, bomb apartment buildings in Beirut and Teheran etc etc, at whom do Collins and her Aussie counterpart choose to wag their fingers? China. For its human right abuses in Xinjiang, and for its crushing of the democracy movement in Hong Kong.
That critique would have a shred of credibility if New Zealand wasn’t so selective in its moralising on human rights.
In condemning only China’s very real human rights abuses, our Defence strategy is being dictated not by our fearless expressions of moral conscience, but by our craven desire to please US President Donald Trump. As if Trump has the attention span and inclination to reward his flunkies for past services.
It is long past time for New Zealand to begin treating the US for what it now is – an unreliable, erratic isolationist power that treats its allies solely in terms of how they can be used to advance America’s interests.
In the Asia Pacific, we need to begin acknowledging that, as a global superpower, China’s military presence in the Pacific is just as legitimate as the American military presence.
We have to stop treating the Pacific as an American pond.
We also need to tell our Defence establishment the bad news: that they can’t continue to make a career out of swapping in China to replace the Soviets in a mindset that still appears to be stuck in Cold War patterns.
America is no longer our friend.
The old tightrope that we used to pride ourselves in walking – rely on China for trade, and the US for defence and security – is delusional in the context of the second Trump presidency. The US/Israeli assault on Iran is doing everyone in the “free” world (let alone the Iranians and the Lebanese) far more harm than good.
The threat that our Defence strategists see China posing to the trade routes in the South China Sea ignores the fact that China is just as dependent as we are on keeping them open.
Meaning: it would be a suicidal blow to China’s economic prosperity for it to stop maritime trade passing through the South China Sea. As is happening in Iran, closing those trade routes down would be a Doomsday Weapon to be deployed only defensively, and only in the context of a prior US attack.
But hey, if only all of us could live within the golden silo inhabited by the Defence boffins.
They get billions for new gear, no questions asked, no cost/benefit analysis required. We are preparing to spend billions more on frigates even though the Iran War has just shown that they would be floating death traps if they were ever used in serious combat.
Most worrying of all, our entire defence policy seems predicated on an alliance with the United States, as if we are still living in the 20th century. There is no acknowledgement by our government that in this part of the world, the US defensive shield no longer exists.
Yet like some forgotten colonial outpost of the American empire, we dutifully demonise China, and treat its presence in the Pacific as an existential threat.
Luxon/Winston/Seymour do not have a clue.
This is certainly a take. A wrong one, but a take.
The “colonial mindset” line is standard diplomatic rhetoric. It reframes criticism as illegitimate without engaging with the substance. Which is China’s increasing willingness to assert control in its region and push against established international rules.
What’s missing from this whole argument is any serious engagement with risk. Or any acknowledgement that this is simply Diplomacy 101: small states hedge, build alliances, and manage exposure in an uncertain world.
In other words; our foreign and defence policy has to be built around managing uncertainty, not wishful thinking.
Raising concerns about the South China Sea isn’t about imagining China will suddenly shut down trade routes for no reason. It’s about recognising that control creates leverage. In a crisis, the ability to influence or constrain access matters, even if it’s never actually exercised. Just look at the situation with Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.
That’s a risk question, not a moral one.
The same applies to defence capability and alliances. Investing in them isn’t warmongering. It’s insurance. You don’t build resilience because you expect the worst tomorrow. You do it because you can’t afford to be exposed if things deteriorate.
The argument tries to turn foreign policy into a morality play: if we criticise China, we must respond identically to every other conflict or we’re hypocrites.
But foreign policy isn’t a purity test. It’s a set of trade-offs made under constraint.
Yes, Western countries are selective in how they apply human rights language. That’s true. But selectivity doesn’t remove the underlying risks we face, and it doesn’t mean we should ignore behaviour in our own region that could materially affect us.
Likewise, the idea that China’s dependence on trade means it poses no risk misses the point. There’s a long history of assuming economic interdependence guarantees stability: a view going back at least to Immanuel Kant. It didn’t prevent great power conflict in the early 20th century, even when major economies were deeply integrated.
At best, interdependence reduces the likelihood of disruption. It doesn’t eliminate the possibility of coercion.
And that’s the real issue here: exposure.
On the US, the picture is also being oversimplified. It is less predictable than it once was, but it remains the dominant security actor in the Pacific. Treating it as either a reliable guarantor or completely irrelevant are both mistakes.
New Zealand doesn’t have the luxury of choosing one side and ignoring the other We have to manage both.
That means trading with China, maintaining relationships with partners like the US, and investing enough in our own capability to avoid being entirely dependent on either.
Not because we want conflict. Because we want options
There's a lot to criticise about our current government: intellectual and moral bankruptcy. The entrenching of the privileges of the landlord class over the safety and future of our children and communities. Weird culture war bullshit during a cost of living crisis. Luxon's continuing mumblefuckery when asked about anything more complicated than what he had for breakfast.
But on foreign policy, this is broadly what a small state acting rationally looks like.
It is a tad galling to hear Collins moralising about human rights. Cough torture and state care cough cough.
Not timely to criticize one of our main trading partners when we might be looking around for other suppliers of fuel in the near future.
China has a considerable domestic oil production, larger than a large chunk of the world oil exporters. However from memory it only covers around 80% of their domestic consumption. The remainder mostly comes from the Gulf states, and the refined surplus from that gets exported.
Which is why China closed off any of the refined exports on the 13th soon after the latest Israeli Gulf war started.
The probability of getting refined fuel shipments from them is pretty damn low.
In fact, I think that the probability of us getting new significiant shipments of refined fuels or LNG on the water for a while is going to be pretty low. The refiners can probably sell excess exported refined fuel for higher prices closer without a long and costly 10 thousand kilometre transit to NZ.
"it only covers around 80% of their domestic consumption."
China imports 68% of their domestic oil consumption.
https://www.worldometers.info/oil/china-oil/
Yeah, you're right. They produce 80% of their domestic hydrocarbons – mostly coal.
Campbell is wearying.
New Zealand's massive trade reliance on China ought not stop us saying what is wrong with China. MFAT are right.
If China's government had a slightly thicker skin than an Axolotyl this would not be an issue at all. China's reaction simply illustrates paranoia and insecurity.
And yes, it is completely within our own national interests to protest against any threat to free passage within the international sea lanes that enable our Asian exports.