‘Germany, Denmark, Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands are expected to open a “return hub” ready to accept transfers in 2027, the Dutch and Danish governments announced in statements. The countries said the scheme would apply to migrants staying illegally in their nations who are subject to deportation, with the Dutch government adding it will provide an alternative if deportees cannot be returned to their country of origin.’ (BBC 17 November).
This approach to illegal immigration has long had currency. Seeing the array of countries in support of such a scheme, others are likely to fall in behind. It is a ratcheting-up of an infrastructure to deal with illegal immigrants, and also a deterrent to illegal migration, and an encouragement to return to the country of origin. Conditions in Rwanda are unlikely to be welcoming.
The Rwanda aspect of this plan is repellent in many ways. Arbitrarily sending people to Central Africa as a punishment, presumably underpinned by financial transfers to Rwanda to pay for this service, has the ring of the African slave-traders, who sold their fellow-Africans into slavery. The “either or” – Rwanda or a return to country of origin – is often a false option. There are obstacles – political, economic, and logistical – to such returns. Building a migrant ghetto in Rwanda is not a long-term, sustainable solution for illegal migration. The problems to be created in Rwanda by this scheme are yet unknown but will be significant. Criticisms of this scheme abound.
People have always moved, more or less voluntarily, for economic, climatic, or political reasons. New Zealand’s population is an example of this movement, by different peoples at different times, for different reasons. And we are not immune to the challenges created by such movements. New Zealand is a case in which, broadly, those challenges are managed effectively within the polity. Unsurprisingly, New Zealand also has a thoughtful, if muted, debate about future population pressures and what that means for inward migration. Many of us think that we need a considered Population Policy, charting long-term population needs in New Zealand.
Such management is not possible elsewhere. Pressures are greater, numbers of migrants expand, the drivers of migration – political instability, poverty, climate – are overwhelming. Globalisation has been a powerful driver of push and pull factors in global population movements. States have been happy to promote migration where, for example, labour market demands are pressing, and economic gains are to be made.
States have been equally happy to seek to reverse the process when that labour is no longer needed. In every case, opening an inflow is easier than reversing the flow. People simply refuse to function as a disposable commodity. They create homes and lives; they expect their economic contribution to be reflected in political rights. They build organisations and alliances. They fight back.
Migration pressures have been growing in the last fifty years, and, in an ever more globalised, unequal, and unstable world, will grow further. They are found on every continent, be it internal migration pressures in China, the misery associated with the US border, or the shocking images of the drowned around European coasts. Arguably, the world faces three existential crises – climate change, economic inequality, and migration.
Nation states have to address this challenge. It is axiomatic that, in a world made up of nation states, they will assume the right to control their borders. They will take positions on, for example, political refugees and economic migrants. They will also be fully aware of the political fallout of migration challenges. Such challenges are always a source of political unrest and are fertile grounds for political extremism.
Nation states must also cooperate internationally to develop sustainable and decent migration policies. Organisations such as the ILO have a long record of analysis of migration, but coordinated, long-term responses are hard to come by. Traditionally, crises arise and responses are cobbled together. There is much thinking still to be done about effective, long-term, and decent outcomes.
The scale of the challenge was addressed by neo-classical economics as long ago as the 1980s. Then, it was suggested that the only way to deflect growing migration pressures would be to transfer 30% or more of developed world wealth to underdeveloped economies, in the hope that such wealth-sharing would reduce migration pressures. For lots of reasons, this is unlikely to happen and is also not a sustainable solution as presented (class politics and power intervene), but the material scale of the required solution is striking.
Several things are obvious. First, the actions of individual states are necessary but not sufficient. Second, multilateral action will be needed. Third, sustainable multilateral action in a polarising world, in which wealth increasingly trumps democracy in the interests of the few, and in which instability grows, is going to be a challenge. Fourth, climate change will exacerbate migratory pressures. Fifth, we have to talk about this issue seriously. Finally, Rwanda-like solutions store up the challenge; they do nothing to solve it.
No comments yet.
Add a comment